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Abstract—Providing functionalities that allow online social
network users to manage in a secure and private way the
publication of their information and/or resources is a relevant and
far from trivial topic that has been under scrutiny from various
research communities. In this work, we provide a framework
that allows users to define highly expressive access policies to
their resources in a way that the enforcement does not require
the intervention of a (trusted or not) third party. This is made
possible by the deployment of a newly defined cryptographic
primitives that provides - among other things - efficient access
revocation and access policy privacy. Finally, we provide an
implementation of our framework as a Facebook application,
proving the feasibility of our approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online social networks (OSNs from now on) are nowadays
used by hundreds of millions of users as the primary way of
interacting and sharing of information and digital resources, as
examples such as Facebook, Flickr, LinkedIn and many others
OSNs testify. As the widespread adoption of OSNs increases
and diversifies into various contexts (such as corporate OSNs),
the need for mechanisms protecting and regulating the pub-
lishing of users’ sensitive resources is becoming paramount.
The totality of OSNs allows users to specify – usually in a
rather limited way – policies protecting their privacy and the
confidentiality of their sensitive data/resources. In this way,
access to such data is restricted to the users that satisfy such
policies. Usually, the enforcement of users’ specified policies
is delegated to the central authority that manages the entire
OSN, and this state of affairs assumes – of course – a large
degree of trust in such central authority. This may be not
acceptable when the shared resources are highly sensitive
(as, for example, in the case of healthcare-related data). A
(quite radical) solution would delegate the entire management
(storage and access control) of resources to their legitimate
owner. This is clearly not feasible in a real world setting.
In this work, we propose a framework for publishing
resources and for establishing social links over an OSN that
gives the owner of the resource a fine-grained control on who
can access the resources without having to trust the manager
of the OSN; in our framework, the task of the OSN manager is
reduced to that of providing reliable storage of the resources.
Specifically, in our framework user can establish a social
relationship with other users and for each such relationship
can specify the type of resources that can be accessed. In
addition, for each published resource the owner can specify
an access policy specifying the type of relationship needed
for a user to access it. Enforcement of access policies is guar-
anteed by means of novel cryptographic primitive, Distance-
Based Revokable Attribute Encryption (DBRA in short, see
Section III), for which we give an efficient implementation
based on the Hidden Vector Encryption of [1] and the Hier-
archical Identity-Based Encryption of [2]. Roughly speaking,
in the implementation of the framework based on DBRA,
the establishment of a link involves the transfer of a set of
restricted decryption keys that depend on the type of resources
that can be accessed. On the other hand, publishing a resource
res involves publishing an appropriately encrypted version of
res. We stress that restricted decryption keys are transferred
only when a new link is established (or removed).
a) Access policies and key propagation: In our frame-
work, a user can express access policies that are closely
tied to the OSN graph that is modeled as a directed graph
in which nodes represent the users of the OSN and edges
represent relationships among users. For example, an access
control policy may state that a user directly connected to
the resource owner is able to access the resource res (given
that she/he possibly satisfies other additional conditions). In
this case, our framework guarantees that res is encrypted in
such a way that keys held by all directly connected users
are sufficient for decryption. Notice that this holds even for
users that have not made any explicit request for accessing
res and for keys that were transferred even before res was
published. Our framework also allows to express policies in
terms of the distance in the OSN. For example, an access
policy might specify a maximum distance at which a resource
can be accessed. For such policies our framework provides a
way for users to propagate decryption keys to their neighbors
until the limit distance from the owner, as specified by the
access policy, has been reached.
b) Key management: In our framework a user needs to
generate only one key (the master secret key msk) during
enrollment. The master secret key is then used to derive the
appropriate keys that are transferred whenever a new link is
created. Publishing a resource does not involve generating new
keys and thus the number of keys that a user need to manage
depends only on the number of incoming links in the OSN
and not on the number of resources he or his neighbors have
published. Similarly, the size of the master secret key of a user
does not depend on the number of resources published or on
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the number of outgoing links. New resources and links can
be added without affecting already published resources and
already established links.
c) Non-Interactive access to resources.: We also stress
that access to a resource by a user that has the appropriate
keys can be achieved without interacting with the resource
owner. Rather the users downloads the encrypted version of
the resource from the OSN and uses keys obtained during the
establishment of the link with the owner of the resource to
decrypt it.
d) Privacy of access policies: In several settings, the
access policy associated with a resource is itself sensitive
information. In our framework the access policy for a resource
is determined by the owner upon publishing the resource and
affects the way the resource is encrypted. DBRA not only
guarantees that the resource cannot be accessed without an
appropriate key but also that the associated policy is kept con-
fidential. All that a user can do is to try to decrypt the resource
using the keys that he has received during the establishment of
the social link with the owner of the resources. If decryption
fails then the user does not have any information on why the
decryption has failed (e.g., which credential was missing).
e) Fast revocation: An OSN is for its own nature ex-
tremely dynamic and thus it is expected that relationship links
might be removed. One way to deal with such a case would be
to have the user re-enroll, re-encrypt all resources and generate
new keys for all of his neighbors. We stress that in case
a link is revoked it is necessary to modify each encrypted
resource, for otherwise nothing would prevent the removed
user to use the old keys to access the unmodified resource. Our
revocation procedure does so without having to completely
recompute the encryption. In turn, if encryptions of resources
are modified then old keys do not work anymore and need to
be updated. Again, our revocation procedure does so without
having to generate keys from scratch. Obviously, revocation
is not retroactive and thus a user retains all resources that he
has decrypted before the link was revoked.
f) Flexible OSN: In the case a user missing a relationship
link with the resource owner wishes to access the correspond-
ing resource, it may ask for the creation of a link. After the link
has been created, the decryption key is passed to it, provided
– of course – that it satisfies the other conditions expressed in
the access policy. Since the OSN may be very dynamic, with
creation and deletion of friendship links, our access control
mechanisms offer the possibility to update an access policy,
by allowing a resource owner to revoke the access to a set of
previously entitled users.
We do not assume that all links and all resources published
by a user belong to the same social (sub-)network but rather
we allow each user to specify for each resource and for
each relationship a set of attributes (that identifies the social
sub-network to which they belong). Specifically, resources
are labeled with pairs (~x, d) where ~x is a vector of some
pre-specified length ` encoding (conditions over) resources’
attributes and d is an integer encoding distance. Links instead
are labeled with pairs (~y, d′) where ~y is also a vector of
length ` and d′ is an integer. If user Alice publishes a
resource specifying (~x, d), then user Bob sharing a link of
type (~y, d′) with Alice can access the resource if and only if
Match((~x, d), (~y, d′)) = true. The Match predicate is true iff
and only if vectors ~x and ~y agree in all positions in which ~y
is not ? and d′ ≤ d.
We now introduce our motivating scenario, describing how
to use our ABE scheme to codify social relationships.
Example 1: Alice uses an OSN to keep in touch with
people she knows and she decides to classify his published
resources according to the following 2 categories: Friends
and Coworkers. Alice has friends from high school, college
and the music club or neighbors; similarly co-workers can
be partitioned according to the 3 different projects Alice is
working on. Thus a resource is labeled with a vector of length
2 over {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. Notice that since Alice is only involved
in 3 projects, no resource will ever be labeled with a vector
having 4 as second component. In addition for each resource
Alice specifies a maximum distance at which the resource can
be accessed. Obviously any such classification is likely to be
partial and to change over time; as we shall see, our system is
flexible enough to allow Alice to dynamically and efficiently
change the classification of her links and resources.
II. OUR FRAMEWORK
We assume that each user u owns a set Ru =
{r1, r2, . . . , rn} of resources. Each resource is denoted by
a name res and by a tuple of pairs (attribute, value)
((att1, val1), (att2, val2) . . . , (attm, valm)), where atti, 1 ≤
i ≤ m are attribute names. Attributes describe relevant features
(in terms of access control purposes) of the resource and
take corresponding values val1, val2, . . . , valm. We represent
a resource with the expression res(a1, a2, . . . , am). Further,
we assume that each user is in charge of her/his own set
of resources. Attributes not only represent features of of
resources to be accessed, but may also store information
about their owners, for example who they are or where they
work. We refer to such sets of attributes as credentials. Given
a resource (or – more generally – a set of resources), a
corresponding access policy expresses under what conditions
a requester may gain access to the stated resource. More
specifically, an access policy for a resource res specifies the
predicates that attributes and corresponding values stored in
resources/credentials owned by a user u have to satisfy in
order for u to access resource res.
Example 2: Now suppose Alice wants to publish an an-
nouncement regarding a concert to all of her friends from the
music club; then she can specify attribute vector 〈3, 0〉. Here
the first attribute (that is, 3) specifies the category of friends to
which it is addressed (3 stands for friends from the music club)
and the second attribute specifies the category of co-workers
(in this case Alice does not want co-workers to receive the
announcement about the concert from her and thus specifies 0).
In addition Alice can specify a maximum distance d she wants
are announcement to be propagated. For example, (〈3, 0〉, 2)
makes the concert announcement accessible to Alice’s friends
from the music club and to their friends.
A. The policy language
We express access control policies by means of access rules
specified by resource owners. Access rules express under what
conditions – which we divide into conditions about distance
and about credential attributes – are to be satisfied a requesting
user gain access to a stated resource. Such access rules and
policies are specified by the resource’s owner.
We introduce the (fairly standard) language we will use to
express access policies over resources in the OSN, starting
with the definition of distance condition and attribute-based
condition. Then, we introduce the precise definition of access
rule and access policy.
An attribute condition is written as u.res.attpredval, where
att is the name of an attribute belonging to resource res
(we omit the user and/or resource name when there is no
ambiguity in referring to the right attribute), pred is a predicate
belonging to {=,≤, <,>,≥, 6=} and val is valid value for the
attribute att. a distance condition is written as dist(u, d) and
it is verified in the case that there is a path between user
u (usually requesting access to resource res) and the user
stating such condition having length less or equal than d. Given
(attribute or distance) conditions cond1, cond2, . . . , condk and
a resource res, a access rule arres for the resource res
is written as res ← 〈cond1, cond2, . . . , condk〉. The mean-
ing of such expression is that, in order to access resource
res, the requester has to possess resources satisfying all
the conditions cond1, cond2, . . . , condu. When the resource
res is clear from the context, we will omit it, writing the
conditions’ list only: arres = cond1, cond2, . . . , condu. An
access policy apres for the resource res is defined as the set
{〈arres1 〉, 〈arres2 〉, . . . , 〈arresv 〉}, where arresi , 1 ≤ i ≤ v are
access rules. A resource res, protected by a corresponding
access policy apres, can be accessed by requester u in the case
that u satisfies at least one of the access rules in apres. Such
access control language allows for quite expressive access
policies defined over resources owned by users of the OSN.
Example 3: Using the above presented policy language, the
access policy for Alice’s announcement ann and stated by
Alice herself can be written as
arann1 = FriendType = “musicclub
′′, dist(u, 2)
In addition, Alice wants to disclose such announcement to
her college friends as well, and this can be expressed as
arann2 = FriendType = “college
′′, dist(u, 1)
Overall, the access policy is thus expressed as
apann = {〈FriendType = “musicclub′′, dist(u, 2)〉
〈FriendType = “college′′, dist(u, 1)〉}
Note that the condition dist(u, 2) means that users accessing
have to be at most at distance 1 from Alice in the OSN graph,
that is they have to be friends with Alice, or friends with
Alice’s friends.
B. Resource publication and access
Once a user u has defined the appropriate access control
policy polres for resource res, he computes the encryption
rˆ of the resource res using the DBRA scheme, described in
Section III, and (apart the resource res, of course) the policy
polres. Then, the user u publishes rˆ on the (possibly untrusted)
OSN repository.
After having published the encrypted version of the resource
res, the user u propagates – according to the access policy
polres – to his friends u1, u2, . . . , ul that satisfy the access
control policy polres (and only to them) the corresponding
decryption keys ku1 , ku2 , . . . , kul .
Once published on the OSN repository, the metadata related
to the encrypted resource ˆres (including, for example, the
owner’s identifier) can be searched by all the OSN’s users. In
this way, once a OSN user u′ – without any connection with
user u – is willing to access resource res, u′ sends a link
creation request to u. Such request contains the attributes of
u′ as well. Upon checking whether the attributes of u′ satisfy
the access policy polres, u decides upon the creation of a
friendship link with u′. In the positive case, u computes a
decryption key ku′ and sends it to u′. Of course, a user has
as many decryption keys as sensitive resource it is entitled to
access. We call such set of decryption keys the key ring of
user u.
Example 4: Alice can specify attributes also for relation-
ships by giving a pair (~y, d) where ~y is a vector of length 2
over Σ˜ = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, ?}. For example, Alice’s link to Bob, a
senior colleague of Alice’s working on Project1, could be be
labeled with the pair (〈0, 1〉, 1). The distance in this case can
be used to assign weights to links. For example, the link to
Carol, a junior colleague of Alice’s working on Project1, could
be labeled with the pair (〈0, 1〉, 2). In this way a document
addressed to senior personnel of Project1 could be labeled
with (〈0, 1〉, 1). In classifying links, a user is also allowed to
use wild cards. For example, Alice’s supervisor David will
be linked to Alice with a link labeled (〈0, ?〉, 1) which gives
David access to documents from all projects Alice is working
on.
As we have seen, resources are tagged with an attribute
vector and a distance encoding the set of users and the
distance in the social up to which owner allows the resource
to be accessed. Going back to our previous example of Alice
publishing a concert announcement with attribute 〈3, 0〉, 2, we
make two remarks. First of all, the distance restriction does
not mean that the announcement cannot be made available at
distance greater than 2 from Alice. Indeed, a friend of Alice’s
can read the announcement and re-post it herself. The distance
restriction only guarantees that if the announcement is read at
distance greater than 2 from Alice, then it cannot be linked to
Alice. As a second remark, in our OSN, the attributes to links
and to resources are not to be taken as recommendations. For
example, by tagging the concert announcement with attribute
〈3, 0〉, Alice does not mean that co-workers should not look at
the announcement and that she relies on the the co-workers’
honesty in not looking at the announcement (experience shows
that such a labeling would be too strong of a temptation to
resist for most people). Rather the resource will not be made
available to co-workers and this will not be enforced by the
central manager of the OSN but rather we will provide Alice
with a publishing procedure that will cryptographically enforce
Alice’s decision of the set of users with which we wants to
share the announcement.
III. CRYPTOGRAPHIC NOTIONS
In this section we present a new cryptographic primitive
that we call Distance-Based Revokable Attribute Encryption
(DBRA, in short) that will constitute the main technical tool
we use to enforce privacy policy in our OSN. In Section IV
we show how to construct DBRA and in section V we show
how DBRA is employed in our construction.
A DBRA scheme consists of six algorithms
(DBRA.KG,DBRA.Enc,DBRA.Dec,DBRA.Derive,
DBRA.Delegate,DBRA.Revoke). The key generation
algorithm DBRA.KG returns an encryption key pk and a
master secret key msk. The encryption algorithm DBRA.Enc
takes as input the encryption key pk, a plaintext M and
ciphertext type in the form of a pair (~x, d) consisting of an
attribute vector ~x of length ` over a fixed alphabet Σ and a
integer distance d. The master secret key msk can be used to
derive, by means of the DBRA.Derive algorithm, restricted
decryption keys that can be used to decrypt ciphertexts.
Restricted decryption keys are also associated with a pair
(~y, d) where ~y is an attribute vector of length ` over the
alphabet Σ˜ = Σ∪ {?} and d is an integer called the distance.
Keys and ciphertexts interact in the following way. For
vectors ~x ∈ Σ` and ~y ∈ Σ˜` and distances (d′, d), define the
value of the predicate Match((~x, d′), (~y, d)) to be true iff
for each i ∈ [`] it holds that yi = ? or xi = yi and d ≤ d′.
In other words, the vectors must match for all positions i
in which ~y is not ? and the ciphertext must have a larger
distance than the key’s. The decryption algorithm DBRA.Dec
takes as input a ciphertext ct and a restricted decryption key
key and, if the attributes, (~x, d′), of ct and, (~y, d) of key
satisfy the Match predicate then the plaintext M associated
with ct is returned. If the attribute vectors do no match, then
DBRA.Dec fails and returns ⊥. We stress that the decryption
algorithm is oblivious to the attributes of ~x and ~y associated
with ciphertext and key, respectively, which need not to be
available in clear to the decryption algorithm. We observe that
the master secret key msk can be seen as the restricted secret
key associated with the all-? attribute vector and distance 0.
In addition to the above algorithm, a DBRA scheme in-
cludes a key delegation algorithm DBRA.Delegate that takes
as input a restricted decryption key for (~y, d) and an integer
d′ > d and returns a key for pair (~y, d′). We stress that
the DBRA.Delegate algorithm need not to know the attribute
vector ~y associated with the key key being delegated.
Finally, the DBRA.Revoke algorithm is used to revoke en-
cryption keys. More specifically, the DBRA.Revoke algorithm
takes as input an encryption key pk′ with the associated master
secret key msk′ and a sequence of old ciphertexts ct′1, ct
′
2, . . .
and old restricted decryption keys key′1, key
′
2, . . . ,. The
DBRA.Revoke algorithm returns a new pair (pkN , mskN )
of encryption and new ciphertexts ctN1 , ct
N
2 , . . . and new
restricted decryption keys keyN1 , key
N
2 , . . . ,. The crucial prop-
erty of the DBRA.Revoke algorithm is that the new cipher-
texts encrypt the same plaintexts with respect to the new key
as the old ciphertexts did with respect to the old key and,
similarly, the new restricted decryption keys have, with respect
to the new encryption and master secret key, the same attribute
that the old keys had with respect to the old encryption and
master secret key. A trivial way to obtain revocation is to
generate a new pair of encryption and master secret key using
the DBRA.KG algorithm and then to decrypt and re-encrypt
the ciphertexts with the new public key and to generate the
new restricted decryption keys using the DBRA.Delegate
algorithm. In our construction of a DBRA, we will use a much
more efficient algorithm.
A. Security properties of DBRA
In this section we describe the security guarantee that are
provided by a secure implementation of a DBRA scheme. As
a first security property, we require that a ciphertext computed
with the encryption algorithm of a DBRA scheme hides the
plaintext to anyone that does not have the appropriate key.
Specifically, suppose that user A encrypts plaintext M using
a secure DBRA scheme and specifying attribute (~x, d) and
obtains ciphertext ct. Then suppose that user B requests and
obtains restricted decryption keys relative to attribute (~y, d′).
Then we require that B is able to decrypt ct and thus recover
M if and only if Match((~x, d), (~y, d′)) = true. In addition to
protecting the plaintext M , we also require that a ciphertext
does not leak any information about the attribute ~x than what
can be obtained from the attribute ~y. In other words, B might
be able to check if Match((~x, d), (~y, d′)) = true. If this is
the case then B knows that ~x and ~y agree in all positions
i in which yi 6= ? but should have no information about
xi for all positions if which yi = ?. On the other hand, if
Match((~x, d), (~y, d′)) = false then B knows that there is at
least one position i in which yi 6= ? and xi 6= yi; but B should
not know where the mismatch occurs and if it occurs for one
position or for more than one position.
IV. CONSTRUCTION OF A SECURE DBRA
First, we present HVE and HIBE and then we show how
they can be used to construct a DBRA scheme.
A. Hidden Vector Encryption
A Hidden Vector Encryption (HVE for short) scheme
consists of four algorithms (HVE.KG,HVE.Enc,HVE.Dec,
HVE.Derive). The syntax and semantics of a HVE scheme
is very similar to that of a DBRA scheme. For sake of
completeness we include it. The key generation algorithm
HVE.KG returns an encryption key pk and a master secret
key HVE.msk. The encryption algorithm HVE.Enc takes as
input the encryption key pk, a plaintext M and ciphertext
type ~x consisting of an attribute vector ~x of length ` over a
fixed alphabet Σ. The master secret key HVE.msk can be used
to derive, by means of the HVE.Derive algorithm, restricted
decryption keys that can be used to decrypt ciphertexts. Re-
stricted decryption keys are also associated with a vector ~y
where ~y is an attribute vector of length ` over the alphabet
Σ˜ = Σ ∪ {?}. Keys and ciphertexts of HVE interact in the
following way. For vectors ~x ∈ Σ` and ~y ∈ Σ˜`, define the
value of the predicate HVE.Match(~x, ~y) to be true iff for
each i ∈ [`] it holds that yi = ? or xi = yi. In other
words, the vectors must match for all positions i in which
~y is not ?. The decryption algorithm HVE.Dec takes as input
a ciphertext ct and a restricted decryption keyH and, if the
attributes, ~x, of ct and, ~y of key satisfy the HVE.Match
predicate then the plaintext M associated with ct is returned.
If the attribute vectors do no match, then HVE.Dec fails and
returns ⊥. We stress that the decryption algorithm is oblivious
to the attributes of ~x and ~y associated with ciphertext and key,
respectively, which need not to be available in clear to the
decryption algorithm. We observe that the master secret key
HVE.msk can be seen as the restricted secret key associated
with the all-? attribute vector.
1) Security properties of HVE: In this section we describe
the security guarantee that are provided by a secure imple-
mentation of a HVE scheme. As a first security property,
we require that a ciphertext computed with the encryption
algorithm of a HVE scheme hides the the plaintext to anyone
that does not have the appropriate key. Specifically, suppose
that user A encrypts plaintext M using a secure HVE scheme
and specifying attribute ~x and obtains ciphertext ct. Then
suppose that user B requests and obtains restricted decryp-
tion keys relative to attribute ~y. Then we require that B
is able to decrypt ct and thus recover M if and only if
HVE.Match(~x, ~y)) = true. In addition to protecting the
plaintext M , we also require that a ciphertext does not leak any
information about the attribute ~x than what can be obtained
from the attribute ~y. In other words, B might be able to check
if HVE.Match(~x, ~y) = true. If this is the case then B knows
that ~x and ~y agree in all positions i in which yi 6= ? but
should have no information about xi for all positions in which
yi = ?. On the other hand, if HVE.Match(~x, ~y) = false then
B knows that there is at least one position i in which yi 6= ?
and xi 6= yi; but B should not know where the mismatch
occurs and if it occurs for one position or for more than one
position. For our implementation we use the HVE system of
[1].
B. Hierarchical Identity-based Encryption
A Hierarchical Identity-based Encryption (HIBE
for short) scheme consists of six algorithms
(HIBE.KG,HIBE.Enc,HIBE.Dec,HIBE.Derive,
HIBE.Delegate,HIBE.Revoke). The key generation algorithm
HIBE.KG returns an encryption key pkI and a master secret
key HIBE.msk. The encryption algorithm HIBE.Enc takes as
input the encryption key pkI , a plaintext M and ciphertext
type ~id consisting of a vector of length ≤ ` over the alphabet
Σ. The master secret key HIBE.msk can be used to derive, by
means of the HIBE.Derive algorithm, restricted decryption
keys that can be used to decrypt ciphertexts. Restricted
decryption keys are also associated with vectors ~id of length
` over the alphabet Σ. Keys and ciphertexts of a HIBE
interact in the following way. For vectors ~id ∈ Σm and
~id′ ∈ Σn, m ≤ n ≤ `, define the value of the predicate
prefix(~id, ~id′) to be true iff for each i ∈ [m] it holds that
idi = id
′
i. In other words, the prefix predicate checks if vector
~id is a prefix of ~id′. The decryption algorithm HIBE.Dec
takes as input a ciphertext ct that encrypt a plaintext M
and a restricted decryption key keyI and, if the vectors, ~id,
of ct and, ~id′ of keyI satisfy the prefix predicate then M
is returned, otherwise HIBE.Dec fails and returns ⊥. We
observe that the master secret key HIBE.msk can be seen as
the restricted secret key associated with the length 0 vector.
In addition to the above algorithm, a HIBE scheme includes
a key delegation algorithm HIBE.Delegate that takes as input
a restricted decryption key for ~id and another vector ~id′ such
that prefix(~id, ~id′) holds and returns a key for the new vector
~id′.
Finally, the HIBE.Revoke algorithm used for revocation has
the same properties than the one for DBRA.
1) Our HIBE system: Our implementation uses the same
HIBE of Boneh, Boyen and Goh [2] (BBG for short) that is
efficient and offers constant-size ciphertexts. In addition our
HIBE system include a revocation procedure not present in the
original scheme. In the following, we assume that the reader
is familiar with bilinear groups. The HIBE.Revoke procedure
works as follows. Recall that in the BBG system the secret is
an element gα2 in the base group and the public key contains
g, g1 = g
α, g2 so all these elements are given as input to the
revocation procedure. The revocation procedure re-randomizes
gα2 by setting the new g
α′
2 to be equal to g
α+β
2 for a random
group element gβ2 . Then, the procedure re-randomizes the only
term in the decryption key where the old α appeared. Indeed,
in the BBG system the first group element of the decryption
keys contains the term gα2 so the procedure can multiply such
first group element by gβ2 to obtain a new key consistent with
the new secret α′ = α+ β. Analogously, the public key gα is
multiplied by gβ to obtain a new public key with the consistent
distribution. Finally, notice that the only group element in the
ciphertext containing α is Ω = e(g1, g2)s = e(g, g2)αs and
notice that the ciphertext also contains the group element gs
so the re-randomization can be obtained by computing Ω′ =
e(gs, g2)
β = e(g, g2)
βs and multiplying Ω by Ω′ to obtain
the new value e(gα
′
, g2)
s with the right distribution. It is easy
to see that the old keys can not decrypt the new ciphertexts
anymore and viceversa. We stress that the above procedure is
efficient because it takes time independent of `, the maximum
length of the identity vectors.
2) Security properties of HIBE: We require that a ciphertext
computed with the encryption algorithm of a HIBE scheme
hides the the plaintext to anyone that does not have the
appropriate key. Specifically, suppose that user A encrypts
plaintext M using a secure HIBE scheme and specifying
vector ~id and obtains ciphertext ct. Then suppose that user
B requests and obtains restricted decryption keys relative to
vector ~id′. Then we require that B is able to decrypt ct and
thus recover M if and only if prefix(~id, ~id′) = true.
C. Implementation of a secure DBRA scheme using HVE and
HIBE
We now show how to construct a secure DBRA scheme
by using a secure HVE and HIBE schemes. The DBRA.KG
algorithm calls the algorithms HVE.KG and HIBE.KG to ob-
tain the pairs (HVE.msk, pk) and (HIBE.msk, HIBE.pk) and sets
msk = ((HVE.msk, HIBE.msk) and pk = (HVE.pk, HIBE.pk).
The encryption algorithm DBRA.Enc take as input a mes-
sage M and a pair (~x, d), and proceeds as follows. It encrypts
M and ~x by using the HVE encryption HVE.Enc with public
key pk to produce ciphertext ctH . Finally it encrypts by
mean of HIBE.Enc and public key pkI the message ctH with
identity ~id = 1d, that is the distance d codified in unary. The
encryption DBRA.Enc returns the output HIBE.Enc.
The DBRA.Derive algorithm takes as input the master
secret key msk and a pair (~y, d) and proceeds as fol-
lows. It calls HVE.KG(HVE.msk, ~y) to obtain keyH . It calls
HIBE.KG(HVE.msk, ~id), where ~id = 1d is a vector that codifies
d in unary, to obtain keyI . The key output by DBRA.Derive
is set to the pair keyH and keyI .
The decryption algorithm DBRA.Dec takes as input a key
key = (keyH , keyI) and a ciphertext ct that encrypts the
plaintext M and works as follows. It uses the decryption
algorithm HIBE.Dec of HIBE with key keyI to decrypt ct
(recall that ct is a ciphertext type of HIBE) and obtains ctH .
Now use the procedure HVE.Dec of HVE with input ctH and
key keyH to obtain the plaintext M .
The DBRA.Delegate procedure takes as input a key
key = (keyH , keyI) for distance d and a new distance
d′ > d and works as follows. It computes key′I =
HIBE.Derive(keyI , 1
d′), where 1d
′
is an encoding of d′ in
unary, and returns the new key pair key′ = (keyH , key
′
I).
The DBRA.Revoke procedure calls the revocation procedure
for the HIBE system.
It is possible to prove that the so constructed DBRA scheme
is correct and secure assuming the correctness and security of
the underlying HVE and HIBE schemes.
V. ACCESS POLICY ENFORCEMENT
We now describe the protocols required to perform the func-
tionalists introduced in Section II. We refer to the terminology
introduced in Section II. Moreover, in the following we assume
that each user of the social network has already executed the
requested cryptographic setup (parameters generation, etc.).
Furthermore, in the following we assume that the user u
executing the protocols for protecting her/his resources, has
defined the set Cu = {cond1, . . . , condn} of the conditions
which she/he is going to use in the definition of the policies
protecting the sensitive resources owned by her/him. We recall
from Section II-A that a condition is an expression of the
form res.attr pred val where res is a resource name, attr
is an attribute name from the ones over which the resource
res is defined, val is a valid value from the corresponding
domain of the attribute attr and pred is a binary predicate
from {=,≤, <,>,≥, 6=}.
A. Enrollment
We assume that the OSN has fixed a DBRA scheme and a
symmetric key encryption scheme SKE. Upon enrolling into
the OSN, a user A generates a pair (pk, msk) of encryption and
master secret key for DBRA by running algorithm DBRA.KG
on input the maximum distance dmax. The encryption key
is published in a publicly-accessible repository whereas the
master secret key is kept by A in a private repository.
B. Resource publication and access
The encrypted version of the sensitive resource is published
on an untrusted repository. As such, we cannot assume the
repository enforces the access control policy associated with
the resource. As we have explained in the sections above, the
access control policy is encoded by means of a policy pair
(~x, d) consisting of an attribute vector ~x and of a maximum
distance d . The policy pair is used by the encryption procedure
of DBRA. More precisely, the publication of a resource R
protected by access policy Pol (and therefore by the corre-
sponding policy pair (~xPol, dPol)) is carried out by performing
the following three steps:
1) User A generates a random secret key skR for sym-
metric encryption scheme SKE by running algorithm
SKE.KG;
2) resource R is encrypted with key sk by running al-
gorithm SKE.Enc on input skR and R obtaining the
permanent ciphertext ctR for resource R;
3) secret key sk is encrypted using encryption key pk with
policy pair (~xPol, dPol) and algorithm DBRA.Enc to
obtain the revocable ciphertext c˜tR for resource R.
The pair of permanent ciphertext and revocable ciphertext
(ctR, c˜tR) are sent to the public repository.
A user that wants to access a resource R with policy pair
(~x, d) using a restricted decryption key with policy pair (~y, d′)
such that Match((~x, d), (~y, d′)) = true first decrypts the
revocable ciphertext c˜tR using algorithm DBRA.Dec and
thus obtaining secret key skR and then uses skR as input
to SKE.Dec to decrypt the permanent ciphertext ctR.
C. Link creation and revocation
In this section we describe how user A can establish link to
user B and assign to the link policy pair (~y, d′) where ~y is a
vector over Σ˜ and d′ > 0 is an integer. User A runs algorithm
DBRA.Derive on input the master secret key msk computed
at enrollment and pair (~y, d) to obtain a restricted decryption
key key that is sent to user B along with encryption key
pk. The restricted decryption key keyA←B will be used by
B to access all resources published by A. In addition, upon
receiving the pair (pk, key) user B propagates the restricted
decryption key to all users user C for which B has established
a link. Specifically, suppose B has established a link with
policy pair (~z, e). Then, using the DBRA.Delegate algorithm
B derives a key with policy pair (~y, d + e) and sends it to
C. C does the same with all her neighbors until maximum
distance dmax is reached.
When user A wants to revoke her link with user B, she
executes the DBRA.Revoke algorithm on input the encryption
key pk, the master secret key msk, the revocable ciphertexts
c˜tR, for all published resources R and the restricted decryp-
tion keys keyA←C for all C 6= B for which A has established
a link. As output, A obtains a new public key pkN , a new
master secret key mskN , new revocable ciphertexts c˜tNR , for
each resource R and new restricted decryption keys keyNA←C .
Finally, A replace pk with pkN in the public repository, msk
with mskN in the private repository, replaces the revocable
ciphertexts c˜tR with c˜t
N
R in the public repositories and sends
the new restricted decryption key keyNA←C to each user C.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In order to evaluate the feasibility of the proposed ac-
cess control model and of the related enforcement protocols,
we developed a prototype application providing the features
described in the previous sections. The prototype has been
developed in Java 6 using the jPBC ([3], [4]) and the Boun-
cyCastle [5] cryptographic libraries and it is deployed as a
Facebook application.
The application architecture follows the client-server
paradigm, as shown in Figure 1. A user interacts through a
web interface with the client module, which is in charge of
generating the user keys and of the encryption/decryption of
the resources. The user is allowed to define the access policy
to be associated to the resource which she/he is currently
uploading on Facebook. Upon the upload in the client module
of the resource, such module execute the steps described in
paragraph on resource publication and it sends the encrypted
resource to the server module, which is in charge of storing it
in the resource repository.
The client module is also in charge of retrieving the list
of friends of the executing user and, after a check against
their attributes, generates the search keys required to access
the uploaded resources. Further, upon receiving a search key,
the client module propagates such key to the owner’s Facebook
friends, following the steps described for creating a link.
The purpose of the server module is to store the encrypted
resources, alongside with metadata such as the resource names
and the references to owners, and to provide a common
interface to search and retrieve them. Note that the decryption
of the resource is performed on the client side. Thus, no
cryptographic material – such as keys – is available to the
server module, other than the encrypted resources.
Resource
Repository
Secure Hub
Client Server
Keys
Facebook
Fig. 1. The architecture of the prototype
We performed two series of experiments to evaluate the per-
formances of the DBRA scheme. More precisely, we tested the
encryption algorithm varying the size of the shared resource
and the size of the vector encoding the access control policy.
The obtained results show that the performances are linear
with respect of both the parameters, as shown in Figure 2.
(a) Resource dimension in KiB (b) Policy vector length
Fig. 2. Experimental results
VII. RELATED WORK
Access control in OSNs is a relatively new research area
in which – nevertheless – several access control models and
related mechanisms have been presented, aiming to overcome
the restrictions of the mechanisms provided by current OSNs
(see [6] for a survey). One of the common characteristics of
almost all the defined access control models is that access
control is relationship-based, that is, authorized users are
denoted on the basis of constraints on the relationships the
requester should have with other network users. In particular,
such constraints refer to the depth of the relationship and/or its
type. As an example, in [7] the authors present a framework
for OSN access control that allows the definition of suitable
policies with respect to the relationships occurring among the
users and the corresponding associated trust values.
In the recent years,several work have been done to the
definition of cryptographic schemes and protocols to store
sensitive data over untrusted storage. As an example, in [8]
the authors propose the deployment of a cryptographic layer
over existing network file systems to provide privacy and con-
fidentiality of the stored files. Their approach uses asymmetric
cryptography to allow the sharing of the files among different
users. In [9] it is presented an alternative approach which avoid
the use of asymmetric cryptography in order to achieve better
performance, with respect to computational time, however
maintaining the flexibility of the key management typical of
asymmetric scheme.
In [10] is presented a mechanism to perform access control
to IPtv streaming data using an ABE scheme. In particular,
the authors evaluate the impact of the deployment of ABE
schemes in a system requiring massive scalability. In [11] the
authors present an information management architecture based
on an ABE scheme. Similarly to our approach, the architecture
proposed uses the attribute-based crypto machinery in order
to enforce access control policies, which are defined upon
verifiable users’ attributes.
The introduction of cryptographic primitives in OSN in
order to enhance the privacy and the security of shared data is
an active research topic. In [12], the authors propose an alter-
native architecture for a distributed OSN, in which a four-layer
client-server deploys cryptographic primitives and sandboxed
environments to safely share and access information.
a) The Persona framework: The work with which we
share more common traits is Persona [13]. In it, the au-
thors present an access control framework for OSN using an
ABE schema, namely the schema deployed in in the library
cpabe [14]. In this way, Persona allows users to apply fine-
grained policies stating which users view their data. The
main differences between Persona’s and our approach can be
summarized in the following four points: (i) more expressive
access policy definition language. Namely, our access policy
language allows the definition of more comprehensive access
control policies. First of all, in our policy definition language
it is possible to express distance constraints and, more im-
portantly, link labels can also contain ? entries. This means
that if the label of the link from Alice to Bob has a ? in
position i, then Bob can access resources regardless of the
i-th attribute. (ii) Access delegation. That is, our framework
allows a user to delegate access to certain resources to her/his
contacts, according to the propagation limits defined. (iii)
Efficient access revocation. Our framework allows a user to
efficiently revoke all the generated keys which allow access
to a given resource, automatically revoking the delegation as
well. Note that in Persona access delegation and revocation
are not supported. (iv) Privacy of the access control policy.
Using our framework, the policy which protects a resource is
known only to the owner. This is because the policy is encoded
by a pair (~x, d) and vector ~x is used to encrypt the resource.
However, we require (and our implementation supports) that
the encrypted resources not only hides the resource but also
the attribute.
We achieve the four improvements listed above by develop-
ing a new cryptographic primitives, DBRA, and by showing
that such a more powerful primitive can still be implemented
in an efficient way.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we have introduced a framework allowing users
of a OSN to express and enforce access control policies for
sharing sensitive information/resources without relying on a
possibly untrusted third party, except for the storage of the
encrypted information/resource. Our solution is based on a
novel attribute-based encryption scheme and offers several
advantages with respect to the existing literature, such as the
possibility of expressing private access policies based on the
topology of the OSN graph, with efficient revocation. We
have implemented our framework as a Facebook application
demonstrating the viability of our approach and showing
that we can reach high levels of privacy with reasonable
performances.
As further work we are currently working on a fully
distributed OSN setting in which we plan to deploy the frame-
work proposed in this work. Subsequently we plain to perform
more extensive experiments and to test other cryptographic
primitives.
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